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Abstract. Th e domain of reference of political discourse is not autonomous from 
language; this domain is a construct generated by the discourse itself. Such an ap-
proach to the relation between language and political reality was expressed in 
George Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four. Concepts of modern semantics and 
pragmatics allow to explicate how language acts as both a form of constructing real-
ity and a special type of social verbal behaviour. Language has become exclusively 
modal and intentional; any utterance expresses the relations of obligation, possibili-
ty, etc. and may be interpreted in intensional and, hence, in referentially non-opaque 
contexts. However, the semantics does not lose its referential force. In contrast, this 
force is multiplied, becoming a transworld relation. In this respect, the semantics of 
political discourse is akin to poetic semantics; however, the multidimensionality of 
the signifi ed referents is hidden because referential discourse is a precondition for 
eff ectiveness. Political discourse, as a description of “world as it is”, presupposes a 
hidden reference to other modal contexts “world in the future” (or “in the past”); 
“how the world should be” (or “should not be”), etc. Th e domain of the interpreta-
tion of political discourse is a set of possible worlds.
Keywords: political reality, language in political function, political discourse, 
Orwell’s linguistic theory, Newspeak, doublethink, multiple reference, possible world 
semantics 
1. In modern linguistics and philosophy, language is considered a mechanism and 
way of constructing reality rather than a means of describing reality. Th e various 
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uses of language that correspond to a variety of social functions create diff erent 
types of reality or, more precisely, diff erent representations of reality. Some versions 
of reality can be detached from language (for example, physical reality). Other “re-
alities” exist solely as semiotic constructions, similar to poetic worlds. However, it is 
obvious in both cases that (1) the representation of reality does not exist apart from 
the language describing this reality, and that (2) any reality acquires some socially 
signifi cant meaning and value only if expressed by linguistic means. 
 “Political reality” can also be viewed in a similar manner. Th is reality is certainly 
not reduced to language rules only; however, fundamentally, this reality cannot be 
expressed without these rules. Political reality cannot exist apart from the language 
by which this reality is described. Th e issue of “language and political reality” can be 
observed on three levels:
(1) Stylistic. Th is level is the case when the information (description of the situ-
ation) inherently carries its evaluation, for example, the information concerning a 
confl ict between two armed groups can be represented either as an attack of extrem-
ists on the forces of law and order or as a reaction of citizens against occupants. 
(2) Manipulative (or rhetorical). Th is level is the case when, under the guise of in-
formation, the addresser imposes his own view on the information, which can cause 
both direct and indirect misinformation, i.e., something that occurs in the process of 
description is so transformed that the addressee receives a distorted representation 
of event: 
It is a type of usage of natural language, and can be identifi ed only through notions 
like goals, intentions, and broader aspects of pragmatic processing, which, in turn, 
explain the quantitatively high presence of some formal features (some types of 
argument schemes and fallacies, some semantically loaded expressions, some 
connotative words etc.) because they are of some help in achieving the speaker’s 
goal. (Saussure 2005: 119)
Th e language means of the fi rst level have been studied more thoroughly than the 
means of the second level. However, both levels have been considered since ancient 
rhetoric, as well as by modern rhetoric which deals with “intertextual relations and 
social operation of texts as integral semiotic entities” (Lotman 1992 : 167). Both of 
these levels presuppose the existence of a reality that is independent of language. Th e 
role of language is reduced to its packaging, which is either adequate or intention-
ally/unintentionally distorting. Yet does political reality really exist? If so, then what 
is the form of existence of that political reality independent of language?  
(3) Semantic. A possible answer to these questions requires the postulation of a 
third level, where the language appears as both a form of constructing and interpret-
ing reality and a special type of social verbal behaviour. As mentioned by the promi-
nent American political scholar Murray Edelman, 
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It is language about political events and developments that people experience, 
even events that are close by take their meaning. So political language is political 
reality; there is no other so far the meaning of events to actor and spectators is 
concerned… (Edelman 1985: 10) 
Description of that deeper level where language rules are interlaced with behaviour 
norms (social interaction) can be labelled as discourse. Such an approach is based 
on the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘language-game’ (“I shall also call the whole, con-
sisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the ‘language-game’.” PI 
Par. 7). We shall not discuss other possible conceptions of discourse because a com-
parison of these options would be the subject of separate research. However, having 
in mind the double ambiguity of the concepts ‘discourse’ and ‘political’ (сf. Wilson 
2001) and to avoid possible misunderstandings let us explicitly refer to the defi nition 
in which the social-context-dependence of political discourse is mentioned:
Since people and their practices may be categorized in many ways, most groups 
and their members will occasionally (also) ‘act politically’, and we may propose 
that ‘acting politically’, and hence also political discourse, are essentially defi ned 
contextually, viz., in terms of special events or practices of which the aims, goals or 
functions are maybe not exclusively but at least primarily political. Th is excludes 
the talk of politicians outside of political contexts, and includes the discourse of all 
other groups, institutions or citizens as soon as they participate in political events. 
Such a contextual defi nition at the same time suggests that the study of political 
discourse should not be limited to the structural properties of text or talk itself, 
but also include a systematic account of the context and its relations to discursive 
structures. (Van Dijk 1997: 15)
2. On the third semantic level mentioned above ‘the reality’ (the signifi ed) is equal 
to ‘the language’ (the signifi er), and the genetic roots of political action are revealed, 
i.e., its origin in myth and rite. On this level, there are special rules of language be-
haviour. Th ese rules are “masked” as common (ostensibly communicative and in-
formative) verbal behaviour but actually pursue other objectives, “they are not made 
to advance knowledge, but to achieve some political success” (Popper 2002[1957]: 
21). Th us, such behaviour is neither the communication nor the description of some 
state of aff airs, but, fi rst of all, is an impetus for transition from one state of aff airs 
to another. When the language is used for political purposes, in contrast to its ref-
erential usage, the main semantic criterion of utterance is not the truth value (its 
correspondence to reality, being true or false) but its felicity, appropriateness and 
eff ectiveness. Th us, political utterances, regardless of their form, can be reduced to 
imperatives. Th erefore, the criterion by which the command “Leave the room!” is 
evaluated is not the proposition itself but its result, i.e., whether the addressee went 
out and whether this action corresponds to the situation. Th e command itself is an 
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action, a certain model of behaviour that is both realized and described through 
speech. Th e evaluation of the utterance is transformed into the evaluation of ac-
tion, i.e., whether the addresser has the right to make the addressee leave the room, 
whether the action is legal or purposeful, and, fi nally, whether the action corre-
sponds to the accepted norms. Political discourse cannot be exhausted by the de-
scription of what is “said”; political discourse should consider by whom, when and 
where the statement was made. However, in contrast to “pure” performatives, on the 
one hand, political discourse cannot always be formalized as a certain required pro-
cedure. For example, declaration of war presupposes a certain procedure (as a rule, 
President’s/Prime Minister’s appeal to the Parliament or President’s decree ratifi ed by 
the Parliament). Yet the same consequences can be ascribed to discourses not for-
malized as “war declarations” (a politician’s provocative speech, excitation of a mili-
tary atmosphere, announcing of a general mobilization, etc.). On the other hand, po-
litical discourse, which is an imperative in its purpose (“Do it so …”) evades such a 
grammatical form, masking as either a neutral description of the indicative mood of 
a neutral description (“Normal people act so”) or a persuasive statement of the sub-
junctive mood (“It would be better if…”). 
 2.1. Th e theory of political discourse cannot be reduced to referential seman-
tics; it must be accomplished by the pragmatic theories describing operational and 
contextual semantics of political discourse – as resulting from the peculiar language-
game. Political discourse is speech as action (rather than only a description of the 
action). For instance, it is obvious that declaring war is a speech act that not only 
describes some political action of declaration of war but also is the action itself. 
Without this speech act, military operations, even if present, are not formally con-
sidered a ‘war’. However, if such an act was performed and if there was no formal 
renunciation of the act, then the parties are considered to be in a state of war, re-
gardless of whether there are military operations. On the one hand, the situation of 
‘undeclared war’ or ‘actual war’, when there are military operations without a formal 
declaration of war, and in contrast, the situation of ‘phoney war’, when the absence of 
military operations does not annul the state of war but only transforms the state of 
war into the subtype of ‘phoney war’.
Th us, the meaning and sense of political discourse are not restricted to the mean-
ing and sense of the uttered words but to the consequences of the action. In terms of 
contemporary linguistics and logic, we should consider the force of utterance, i.e., 
the three semantic and pragmatic forces or planes of political discourse, which are 
described as speech acts: (1) what does the utterance itself express, i.e., its semantic 
and linguistic content; (2) what infl uence does the addresser intend to have on the 
addressee; and, fi nally, (3) what infl uence did the utterance have on the addressee. 
Moreover, in political discourse these factors are oft en formalized as compulsory 
procedures or conditions of speaking. Th erefore, the theory of speech acts must be 
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completed by that of performatives, when the parameters of the communicative con-
text (compulsory “felicitous conditions”) should be given an explicit description. 
Th us, the utterance “I sentence you to a year’s imprisonment” has its static linguistic 
meaning, regardless of by whom, when and in what circumstances the utterance was 
made. However, the utterance acquires an adequate communicative value only when 
publicly uttered by a judge in a court of law and in the presence of an audience re-
quired by the procedure. Without complying with these conditions, the utterance, 
although having a linguistic meaning, makes no sense (or is, at best, irrelevant). Th is 
rule is also true for those utterances that are not formally proper performatives. Th e 
semantics of a statement (its truth value) is not determined by its correspondence to 
the reality but by the extent to which its production and evaluation meet the condi-
tions required by the appropriate procedure. Th e decisive factor is the compliance 
with the rite (procedure); thus, the Parliament’s decision is valid if the decision was 
made in accordance with the procedure described in some regulations. However, the 
same statement will not be considered valid if, for example, the statement was re-
moved from its fi xed place and made at an inappropriate time.
Restating Alfred Tarski (1944), with respect to political discourse, the semantic 
rule “Th e utterance ‘Snow is white’ is true if snow is white” may be complemented by 
the indication of whether all of the conditions were met: 
Th e proposition “Snow is white” is true if in compliance with a certain procedure, in a 
certain place and time, the required majority of those individuals present state “Snow is 
white”; thus, this statement is a true proposition. 
Will snow become black if more than 50% of those individuals present vote for 
the proposition “Snow is black”? Of course not. However, the proposition “Snow is 
black” will acquire the status of a normative statement,1 even for those individuals 
who voted against the proposition. 
1 A normative statement may be defi ned as an utterance that includes the statement of its 
truth as a modal frame: “Somebody considers proposition “P” to be true”. Th at is why its 
truth value, in compliance with both Frege’s principle of compositionality and the theory of 
propositional attitudes, must be evaluated with regard to this frame. Th us, the proposition 
“Snow is white” is true if snow is white. However, a proposition such as Th e parliament of N… 
considers that snow is black” is a true proposition if the parliament of N… considers that “Snow 
is black” is a true utterance. If such a modal-contextual frame is omitted as a tautological one, 
then an illusion of self-evidence occurs; the statement concerning uttering some statement is 
replaced by a statement concerning some state of aff airs: “It is true that the parliament of N… 
decided to consider the utterance “Snow is black” to be true” transforms into the statement 
“Snow is black”. 
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3. Such an important, if not decisive, role of pragmatic factors may create an illusion 
that political discourse (and the political function of language) is a language usage 
that does not have referential semantics2 but only pragmatics; the utterance is char-
acterized by its force (the addresser’s intention, i.e., infl uence on the addressee) and 
by its performative felicity. As a result, political language is oft en considered a tool of 
propaganda rather than a means of describing reality. If reality (the referential aspect 
of discourse) exists, then reality exists only in a distorted way, and language becomes 
a means of distorting rather than describing reality. 
Orwell brought this approach to its logical end; thus, it makes sense to discuss its 
conception, which has not been formalized as a theory but represented as the novel 
Nineteen Eighty-Four. Orwell’s approach is based on two basic assumptions:
(1) Th e constructed reference may have no connection with the reality.
(2) Th e constructed reality requires a special language, Newspeak.
If political discourse does not refl ect the reality but distorts the reality, and if it is 
simultaneously impossible to outline the limits of the distortion, then the construc-
tion of referential domains (“imaginary reality”) may not correspond to the reality at 
all but may be a result of the process of discourse production. Discourse is based on 
some image of reality and regenerates this image in its turn. In such a world, physi-
cal reality (the matter) disappears; reality is (1) what people think of reality and (2) 
what the Party considers as true, wherein the former “image of the world” ought to 
coincide with the latter. Winston Smith’s “fault”, according to his opponent, is that he 
still believes in the existence of physical matter. However, the characters of Orwell’s 
novel are not only liars, similar to poets who create texts concerning fi ctional events, 
for which Plato suggested expelling the poets from the Ideal State – although some 
ideas of Orwell’s personages are reminiscent of Plato’s arguments concerning why li-
ars must be expelled, their aims are opposite. Plato denies any existence of fi ction 
in the State because there must be only one single truth. Yet in Orwell’s totalitarian 
dystopia the fi ction, which is constantly changing but unique at any certain period, 
is taken for truth. Not only is the existence of unchangeable facts denied but so is 
any mental, and even physical, reality that would not depend on the objectives of 
the Party and that could be preserved in the memory of people or in documents. 
In Plato’s case, the world appears as a set of fi xed and unchangeable propositions, 
2 Cf.: “Th e public purpose of political discourse is to inspire in the addressee – citizens of 
the community – the need for “politically correct” actions and/or assessments. In other words, 
the purpose of political discourse is not to describe (i.e., not a reference), but to persuade, 
awakening intentions in the addressee, to provide ground for convincing him and provoking 
him to operate.” (Demyankov 2002: 38, my translation, S.Z.) 
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irrespective of the variety of its possible linguistic expressions. In the case of 
Oceania, the world may exist only to the degree that the world is taken as the sphere 
of reference for the statements whose truth is taken for granted at the given moment. 
Th ere is nothing in that world that can be treated as logical propositions, which are 
semantic structures that are independent of language and of contexts.
3.1. Th e discrepancy between these approaches could be solved if, as suggested 
by Aristotle,3 the special modalities, or diff erent types of reality are taken into con-
sideration. Th e constructed reference does not necessarily entail the falsity of the re-
spective utterances. Th e Party’s instructions to rewrite all records to create the new 
fabricated reality presuppose that a “real” (true, unconstructed) reality should be 
erased from memory. However, in the novel itself, the existence of the “real” reality is 
constantly denied. Th us, even the “true description”, which is a piece of an old news-
paper as if accidentally read by Winston, is a text fabricated for provocative purpos-
es. Th e treatise Th e Th eory and Practice of Oligarchic Collectivism had been written 
and distributed for the same purpose. Simultaneously, the novel itself is fi ction but 
pretends to be a true description of what actually occurred. Th us, the characteris-
tic feature of political discourse is not falsehood, which is non-correspondence with 
reality, but distortion of the reality, double reference, and interpretation of the utter-
ance in at least two domains simultaneously. Th ere are two things given within the 
same verbal expression: not only what happened, but also what is described as hav-
ing had ostensibly happened. In the novel itself, this characteristic double reference 
is accounted for as doublethink4, lying at the basis of the predominant ideology. Th e 
mechanism of doublethink, as Orwell describes it, is in some respect similar to the 
semantics of the metaphor: to understand a metaphor, one should simultaneously 
correlate both the literary meaning and the fi gurative interpretation of the meta-
3 Cf.: “It is, moreover, evident from what has been said, that it is not the function of the poet 
to relate what has happened, but what may happen, – what is possible according to the law of 
probability or necessity. Th e poet and the historian diff er not by writing in verse or in prose. 
Th e work of Herodotus might be put into verse, and it would still be a species of history, with 
meter no less than without it. Th e true diff erence is that one relates what has happened, the 
other what may happen.” Aristotle, Poetics, 1451a (Butcher, Samuel Henry, trans.; available at 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/poetics.mb.txt).
4 “Doublethink lies at the very heart of Ingsoc, since the essential act of the Party is to use 
conscious deception while retaining the fi rmness of purpose that goes with complete honesty. 
To tell deliberate lies while genuinely believing in them, to forget any fact that has become 
inconvenient, and then, when it becomes necessary again, to draw it back from oblivion for 
just so long as it is needed, to deny the existence of objective reality and all the while to take 
account of the reality which one denies – all this is indispensably necessary. Even in using the 
word doublethink it is necessary to exercise doublethink. For by using the word one admits that 
one is tampering with reality; by a fresh act of doublethink one erases this knowledge; and so on 
indefi nitely, with the lie always one leap ahead of the truth.” (Orwell 1971[1949]: 171)
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phorical utterance. For example, the utterance “the sun is smiling” obtains a meta-
phorical meaning only in case the two domains of reference are correlated with each 
other. Th e fi rst domain neglects the real world and is where the sun is an animate 
creature that can smile, and the second domain is the real world, where this utter-
ance is synonymous with the utterance “the sun is shining” (van Dijk 1975: 179). If 
there is no such double correspondence, the metaphor either lacks sense or loses its 
metaphorical essence and becomes a so-called “dead metaphor” (Searle 1979: 255). 
3.2. Th e conception of doublethink and double reference updates and completes 
the idea that was previously expressed by Orwell, with some polemic exaggeration, 
that political language is a tool for disseminating falsehood and misinformation 
(Orwell 1972[1946]). Th e matter is not that politicians are liars and therefore use a 
special language, but in the double reference of the utterance, when at least one of 
the domains of reference (the picture of the world represented by the utterance) is 
a constructed reality. Yet the constructed reference does not mean at all that the ref-
erence does not exist or else is fabricated, as is suggested by Orwell. Are “our” lin-
guistic means capable of describing the constructed domains of reference (“political 
reality”) or is a new language (Newspeak) required for this purpose, as is suggested 
in the novel?
In this case, Orwell’s approach paradoxically resembles the theories of logi-
cal analysis of language and of logical positivism; the common ground between 
these theories is the idea of the insuffi  ciency of natural language and the necessity 
for a new language (logical newspeak) for its adequate description. In both cases, 
the same question arises: is it possible to picture a world in an adequate way by the 
means of natural language (“Oldspeak”) if we simultaneously accept that a true “state 
of aff airs” exists, at least as a theoretical construct or as a concept in the conscious-
ness of an omniscient God (in Orwell’s novel, the omniscience is transposed to the 
Party). Th e issue of the insuffi  ciency of linguistic means has been examined not only 
in linguistics and philosophy, but also in poetry, as well as in mathematics and in 
natural sciences. However, if in logic and natural sciences this matter was the crea-
tion of a new language, then in poetry and in other spheres of the functioning of 
natural language its extension does not concern the inventory of linguistic units, 
which, except in some experimental cases, remain the same. In such cases, language 
extension is due to the introduction of new rules of formation and interpretation, 
which are built on top of one another and which lead to a radical transformation of 
the original system. 
Concerning political discourse, the problem may be expressed in the following 
way: whether there is a requirement for a special language, i.e., Newspeak, to con-
struct the fabricated reality, as was suggested by the characters of the novel and, 
most likely, by the author himself. Th is problem may be the case when the text itself 
denies the theory by which it was generated. Noticeably, in both the article “Politics 
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and the English language” and the Appendix to the novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
Newspeak appears to be a set of certain stylistic means that in several cases some-
times even exaggerates the peculiarities of common English, rather than a new lan-
guage. Moreover, the novel itself is written in Oldspeak, and the characters of the 
novel communicate in Oldspeak5. In addition, Oldspeak allows the expression of in-
admissible thoughts, whereas in Newspeak it is impossible to express these thoughts, 
and even if these thoughts are expressed, they sound pointless6. However, even if 
such a situation is possible, no totalitarian regime managed to create a new language. 
Totalitarian practices do not typically create new languages; these practices prohibit 
non-authorized meanings, which sometimes lead to the prohibition of some non-
designated languages (or languages of rebellious minorities) as a means of expres-
sion of any thought at all.  
4. Th e text of the novel itself denies Orwell’s idea concerning the necessity of a 
special language for the distortion of reality; the text demonstrates that, by the same 
linguistic means, it is possible to describe both the real and the distorted states of af-
fairs. Th e novel itself, as well as any other fi ction, proves the possibility of describing, in 
principle, both what has happened and what has not happened. Even if the diff erence 
between those descriptions is expressible (the latter is quite disputable), at least this 
diff erence does not depend on the language. In our real world, Orwell constructed a 
fi ctional world that we are to perceive as really existing and where the fi ctional char-
acters construct a third world, which we are to perceive as a fi ctitious one fabricated 
by the Party. None of these worlds present an interest in isolation; the system of these 
worlds constitutes the domain of reference that is assigned to the novel. Some fi ctional 
reality (“our world in 1984”), which was fabricated by Orwell, pretends to be a de-
scription of what actually happened (or would happen) in 1984. Th is fi ctional reality 
includes fi ction of the second order, i.e., all verbal and mental images imposed by 
the Party as the reality and as actual history. However, there is also room for “our” 
5 Cf.: “Totalitarianism generally dispenses with those powerful means of transformation that 
the creation of a new language requires. However, G. Orwell’s novel itself doesn’t contradict 
this thesis: V. Chalikova noticed that even though the characters are permanently talking about 
Newspeak, it isn’t represented in the novel but for a few words – the executioner and his victims 
expresses themselves in an immaculately crystalline Orwellian English.” (Kuznetsov 1994: 187; 
my translation, S.Z.) 
6 “Th is was done partly by the invention of new words, but chiefl y by eliminating undesirable 
words and by stripping such words as remained of unorthodox meanings, and so far as 
possible of all secondary meanings whatever.” (Orwell 1971[1949]: 241) “Th ere would be many 
crimes and errors which it would be beyond his power to commit, simply because they were 
nameless and therefore unimaginable. And it was to be foreseen that with the passage of time 
the distinguishing characteristics of Newspeak would become more and more pronounced – 
its words growing fewer and fewer, their meanings more and more rigid, and the chance of 
putting them to improper uses always diminishing.” (Orwell 1971[1949]: 250) 
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actual world: Nineteen Eighty-Four exists in our real world as a written text and as 
a work of art (a novel, a movie, a fi lm script, etc.). Regardless, this novel has been 
functioning in our world as a sample of fi ction and not as a documental descrip-
tion of what happened (or might have happened) in 1984. For simplifi cation, leav-
ing all the intermediate worlds (such as worlds of the critics analysing the novel, the 
fragments of British history depicted in the novel, the non-coinciding mental worlds 
of the characters, etc.), we may conclude that the semantics of the novel is formed 
not only by one of the worlds but through correlations between the aforementioned 
three worlds: (1) Our actual world where we now we live, where Orwell once lived, 
where he has written his novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, and where we have been read-
ing this novel. (2) Th e world of the novel created by Orwell, which is the actual 
world for the fi ctional characters who live in that world. (3) Th e fi ctional world cre-
ated and enforced by the omnipotent Party, which ought to be considered as a “true 
reality” by the characters of the novel. Th e comprehension of the novel is based on 
mapping worlds onto each other with one of the worlds interpreted by the means 
of another world. For example, we “transfer” into our world the Oceanian Minitrue 
and Minilove, or vice versa. In the world of the novel, we can trace Trotsky, who has 
become its Goldstein, or attach the moustache of Stalin to Big Brother’s face, etc.
Th us, the semantics of the novel is based on multiple references to the given 
stratifi ed domains of interpretation and the transworld correspondences between 
textual signifi ers. Modal semantics does not merely set up the correspondence/lack 
of correspondence between an utterance and reality; modal semantics also operates 
as a system of alternative worlds, where one and the same state of aff airs may re-
ceive various modal values (e.g., in one of the worlds, something may be viewed as 
true, whereas in another world it may be considered possible or due to exist, not 
due to exist, etc). Diff erent events may be simultaneously occurring; however, in mo-
dally diff erentiated worlds (e.g., in one of the worlds, Emmanuel Goldstein is one 
of the main actors of the Revolution and the founders of the Party, whereas in the 
other worlds he is a permanent enemy of the Party, and in yet other worlds he never 
existed but was fabricated by the Oceanian rulers – similarly to his prototype Leo 
Trotsky, who, in accordance with some historical records, actively participated in the 
civil war, but is not mentioned in other records; see below). As semantic interpreta-
tion, a bizarre combination of diff erent “truths” may emerge, which are discovered 
through some discourse and which pretend to be considered a description for “what 
really was” in contrast to other, “false” discourses – although some of the discourses 
may be designated as “real” (however, in actuality, all of the discourses are “norma-
tive” – see Footnote 1). Th us, one can speak of interaction between various modal 
semantics rather than primitive falsifi cation [However, even primitive distortion 
may be considered a degenerative case of interactions between diff erent modalities, 
where some worlds (set of events and objects) are empty].  
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Orwell was aware of this falsifi cation, despite all his accusations against politi-
cians and politicized historians. In “Notes on nationalism” (1945) he somehow di-
gressed from the main theme, diff erentiating between various types of correspond-
ence/lack of correspondence between reality (history) and its description:
Th e primary aim of propaganda is, of course, to infl uence contemporary opinion, 
but those who rewrite history do probably believe with part of their minds that 
they are actually thrusting facts into the past. When one considers the elaborate 
forgeries that have been committed in order to show that Trotsky did not play 
a valuable part in the Russian civil war, it is diffi  cult to feel that the people 
responsible are merely lying. More probably they feel that their own version was 
what happened in the sight of God, and that one is justifi ed in rearranging the 
records accordingly.7         
Orwell’s idea can be rearticulated in terms of the semantics of possible worlds be-
cause modal contexts, such as beliefs and convictions, up to the point of view of an 
omniscient observer (God) are considered. Hence, the semantics of an utterance 
is not restricted to only two values (true/false). Th e evaluation depends less on the 
compliance of the description with reality, but rather on the point of view of the 
creator of the description, who believes in absolute truth or the correctness of the 
description. A similar situation is typical not only of political (propagandistic) dis-
courses, but quite oft en there is also a contrast between two versions of reality: “what 
really happened” and “what is written in the textbooks” (or in other normative texts) 
of the humanities (particularly historical ones), i.e., when diff erent descriptions of 
reality are opposed to each other, either pretends to be recognized as “the only true 
one”. Discourses with similar structures carry an important heuristic role in sci-
ence when a new theory should replace an old theory, and the degree of falsifi cation 
of both old and new theories (the possibility of their refutation via correlating the 
theories with new facts) is an indicator of their scientifi c status, in compliance with 
Popper’s criterion of falsifi cation. However, the case is completely diff erent for po-
litical discourses and politicized history. As there is no way to distinguish facts from 
their description,8 a new description creates its own factual base. Th e previous the-
ory is considered inadequate, if not deceitful. Facts become less decisive than eval-
uations concerning these facts. In contrast to the usual historical texts, those texts 
7 Orwell’s “Notes on nationalism” (1945) was accessed at http://orwell.ru/library/essays/
nationalism/english/e_nat.
8 Cf.: “In natural science it is easy to diff erentiate a qualitative transition from simple 
observations of facts to theory. Conversely, in history words just refl ect other words. Th at’s why 
the diff erence between facts and theories about them is relative, and it is usually ignored. So 
much the worse for history.” (Steiner 2004: 158, my translation S.Z.)
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cannot be adequately perceived separately, i.e., without relating to those discourses 
that these texts are supposed to deny. For example, the narrative that Trotsky played 
no prominent role in the Russian Civil War is meaningful only if the narrative has 
an opposite narrative as its obligatory intertextual counterpart. Th e semantics of the 
abovementioned type of texts depends on the interaction of at least two descriptions 
and is reminiscent of the mechanisms of counterfactuals or literary semantics with 
its interplay between interpenetrating worlds and a permanent inversion between 
“actual” and “fi ctional”. However, notably, the set of worlds itself (their paradigm or, 
in terms of modal logic, model structure) is given and does not change. Hence, in 
the world where Trotsky is a civil war hero, there are also possibilities for him to act 
as a traitor, a passive observer, etc., and all of those possibilities are given as a set of 
possible worlds that are accessible from the initial world. 
Not only worlds (i.e. descriptions of states of aff airs) are subject to permanent 
changes, but also their semantic and modal evaluations, i.e., which of the worlds is 
to be considered as the actual world, which world actually existed and which non-
existing world was to exist (referring to the ideas of Orwellian re-writers of history). 
In addition, someone rewriting history thereby corrects the mistake of the previous 
narrator by substituting a modal context with another, i.e., the actual but undue inel-
igible world is replaced by some other world: a non-existent world that ought to ex-
ist, although in the past. It is appropriate to recall Plantinga’s “book” version of pos-
sible world semantics: “Each world has its book. Similarly, each maximal possible set 
of propositions is the book on some world” (Plantinga 1972: 46–47). Simultaneously, 
in transition from one world to the other, the set of books (library) does not change; 
this reasoning answers the question “Which of the books contains only true proposi-
tions?” which may be varied.
 
5. Th us, the domain of interpretation of political discourse and the scope of refer-
ence of its linguistic expressions is a system of possible world and transworld rela-
tions. As the suggested approach is based on the idea of inter-world accessibility, 
it would be reasonable to refer to its classic source: “A normal model structure is 
an ordered triple (G, K, R), where K is a non-empty set, K ⊇ G, and R is a refl exive 
relation defi ned on K”. If the notion of a “possible world” is introduced, this element 
K from G can be singled out as the “real” world (Kripke 1963: 68–69). In other, less 
technical words, model structure is an ordered triple {{W0; {W}; R}} of compatible 
(accessible) worlds and some relations of accessibility between them: {W} is a cer-
tain set of possible worlds, W0 – a certain “privileged” world (for example, the actual 
world), R – given modal (inter)relations upon {W}. It actually means that a certain 
“privileged” world, alongside with a set of further compatible worlds, is selected out 
of a certain universe of worlds. Th e semantics of linguistic expressions is derived 
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through procedures of correlating propositions and possible worlds within some 
model structure.
Th e novel Nineteen Eighty-Four itself can be considered as a peculiar model 
struc ture, where diff erent modal domains (worlds, or models) are interconnected 
and complicate each other. It pretends to describe both true history (what happened) 
and, as a part of the latter, those discourses that are imposed on the inhabitants of 
the fi ctitious world of the novel as a true history. Th e polemics between the char-
acters of the novel concern the reality and changeability of history as if anticipating 
the post-modernist theory of historical discourse, i.e., concerning the semiotically 
constructible character of historiography and the mood of the existence of the his-
torical past. Meanwhile, the fi ctitiousness of the reference and its constructability are 
diff erent because of their nature. In all cases when reality is substituted by its mental 
or verbal image, the domain of reference is to be constructed, and the instruments 
and safeguards for ensuring the correspondence between reality and its description 
are exclusively limited by natural language or by any other sign system. Such de-
pendences on semiotic means and on the constructed character of reference are not 
symptoms of “ineffi  ciency” or of falsity of description. It is quite another matter that 
the semantic characteristics of the discourse are substituted for pragmatic ones, and 
the decisive parameter is not the correspondence between reality and its description, 
but the eff ectiveness of the discourse, i.e., to what extent the discourse facilitates 
the objectives set by the sender of the message. Th ese objectives can be achieved by 
such extralinguistic means described in Orwell’s novel as extermination of other 
images (discourses) concerning the past and the present, and even concerning the 
persons who might be associated with such images by making these persons “un-
persons” (a semiotic purge should be accomplished by psychological and physical 
violence).  
However, even in the cases of total violence and of falsifi cation of all documen-
tary evidence, modal diversity does not disappear. In the novel, the deontic modal-
ity (the current state of aff airs as described by the offi  cials of Oceania) pretends to 
be the only designated and allowed political modality. However, this discourse im-
plies the existence of some other discourses, i.e., some “undue” state of aff airs that 
is becoming “true” through eff orts of the Party leadership. Th e Party itself has to 
produce some discourses concerning “undue” worlds – “Oceania prior to the revo-
lution”, which is described in textbooks and in offi  cial documents, or in Goldstein’s 
treatise Th e Th eory and Practice of Oligarchic Collectivism as the “true description” 
concerning the actual state of aff airs in Oceania, as well as numerous “plots” which 
are invented and organized by the secret service (“Minitrue”). Moreover, there is a 
requirement to have a description of the “actual world”, an explanation why all of the 
inhabitants of Oceania are under permanent surveillance. Th erefore, a modal system 
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of at least three worlds should be considered: “Oceania as it is”; “Oceania as it was”; 
“Oceania as it is described”. 
In spite of the function ascribed to “Newspeak” in the novel, in cases when Or-
well describes the construction of a non-existent reality (for example, school books 
or instructions on the rewriting of history or the process of creation of the non-ex-
istent hero comrade Ogilvy), contextual circumstances appear to be more important 
than the structures of the language. Th e change refers not so much to the structure 
of the language as to the modality of the text. Th is change demonstrates that the dif-
ference between political and “ordinary” languages lies not in the language means but 
in the changes of the rules of interpretation and reference. For that reason, there is no 
requirement to invent any “Newspeak” at all; the natural language – “Oldspeak” – it-
self contains a range of “Newspeaks” as its possible variants. Th e trick made by ad-
dressers of political discourse, and left  unnoticed by Orwell, particularly consists 
of using “the ordinary language” with the expectation that the addressee of the text 
would not notice that, under the cover of “allegedly ordinary language”, text seman-
tics presupposes other rules and operations for the interpretation of the given dis-
course.9 As a rule, the “lexicographic interpretation” is not suffi  cient to notice and 
to describe this linguistic trick (as is performed in the abovementioned footnote). In 
this case, we require more sophisticated mechanisms of modal semantics (semantics 
of possible worlds). For example, in Orwell’s novel, the proper name ‘London’ sig-
nifi es various objects in several non-coinciding worlds – “our” world, the author’s 
world, the world of the characters and readers of the novel, i.e., the “actual” London, 
the London that existed in the past and is unsuccessfully reconstructed in the mem-
ory of the hero of the novel, the London that is described in the novel, etc. Th e set of 
9 As a working example, let us adduce Chomsky’s (2001) explication of a similar “double” 
interpretation (“literal” and “propagandistic”) of the expression “rogue state” – one of the key 
interpretations for today’s system of international relations: 
     “QUESTION: How would you defi ne a ‘rogue state’? CHOMSKY: “A ‘rogue state’ is a state 
that defi es international laws and conventions, does not consider itself bound by the major 
treaties and conventions, World Court decisions – in fact, anything except the interests of 
its own leadership, the forces around the leadership that dominate policy. Well, fi rst of all, 
remember that I’m using the term in a neutral sense, in terms of its meaning. Almost every 
term in political discourse has a literal meaning and a propaganda version. And I’m using it in 
the literal meaning. Th e propaganda version – which is typically the one that prevails – that’s the 
version presented by those who have the power to control discourse, propaganda, framework 
of discussion, and so on. And, in that case, that means primarily the United States. As the 
United States uses the term ‘rogue state’, it refers to anyone who’s out of control. So, Cuba’s a 
‘rogue state’ because it does not submit to U.S. domination. Th at’s a diff erent usage entirely. As 
I use the term ‘rogue state’, the leading ‘rogue state’ in the world is the United States. Th at’s the 
neutral term”. (“Rogue states draw the usual line. Noam Chomsky interviewed by Christopher 
Gunness”. Agenda, May 2001, accessed at http://www.chomsky.info/interviews/200105–.html) 
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all of these objects will be the semantics of this word in the novel: the interrelation 
between the real and fi ctitious cities. Th ere is no reason to deny the connection be-
tween the “real” London and the “chief city of Airstrip One”, the province of Oceania 
that “had once been called England or Britain”, described in the novel. However, in 
contrast it would not be right to equate these cities. Th e utterance “London is the 
capital of Great Britain” is false, yet the utterance “London is the capital of Airstrip 
One of Oceania” is true in the world of the novel. Th e reasoning is the opposite in 
our actual world. However, the expression “London is the capital of the Airstrip One 
of Oceania” is not meaningless in our world; even out of the referential scope of the 
novel, the expression has a specifi c intertextual semantics and refers to the world 
of the novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, making it explicit what contemporary London 
would be like if the course of history had taken a diff erent turn. 
Simultaneously, the constructible character of reference causes a change in a 
range of semiotic characteristics of the language, not in the linguistic forms of ex-
pression (signifi ers), but rather in the signifi ed senses and meanings. As a result, 
new secondary modelling systems (connotative) have emerged, and on the supra-
language level the rules of interpretation of language utterances have changed in a 
substantial way. Th e signifi ers remain the same, creating the illusion that the sign re-
fers to the same object, while implicitly connecting two diverse objects from two dif-
ferent worlds.10 In a way, this relation can be considered metaphorically (in Lakoff ’s 
sense) – one world is unnoticeably interpreted using the other world. 
6. In summary, multiple semantics (multi-world reference) is the essential charac-
teristic of political discourse. Language has become exclusively modal and inten-
tional: any utterance expresses the relations of obligation, possibility, etc. and may be 
interpreted in intensional and, hence, referentially non-opaque contexts where the 
proposition should be interpreted indirectly, exclusively regarding some state of af-
fairs with respect to the contextual propositional attitude of beliefs, opinion, custom, 
norm, etc. However, the semantics does not lose its referential force; in contrast, this 
force is multiplied, becoming a transworld relation. In this respect, the semantics of 
political discourse is akin to poetic semantics; however, the multidimensionality of 
the signifi ed referents is obscured, with referential discourse as a precondition for 
political eff ectiveness. Political discourse as a description of “world as it is” presup-
poses a hidden reference to other modal contexts: “the world in the future” (or “in 
10 Cf.: “Two diff erent symbols can therefore have the sign (the written sign or the sound sign) 
in common – they then signify in diff erent ways. It can never indicate the common characteristic 
of two objects that we symbolize them with the same signs but by diff erent methods of symbolizing. 
For the sign is arbitrary. We could therefore equally well choose two diff e rent signs and where 
then would be what was common in the symbolization.” (TLP 3.321–322)
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the past”); “how the world should be” (or “should not be”), etc. Th us, the domain of 
the interpretation of political discourse is a set of possible worlds (Kripke’s model 
structure mentioned above). 
For us, such a system itself is neutral with respect to political and ideological 
purposes; the system can be grounds for either totalitarian or democratic discours-
es, and we do not intend to associate it either with language practices of totalitar-
ian regimes (as was done in Young 1991; Gronskaya et.al. 2012) or with so-called 
“American-style propaganda” as was suggested in Chomsky 1988: 79. For Orwell, 
political language “is designed to make lies sound truthful”, and “this is true of all 
political parties” without any exception (Orwell 1946). A formal structure of dis-
course is exclusively a means of expression of any ideological content and is com-
parable with language.11 Assessment is not subject to the system itself per se but 
rather how and for what purposes the assessment is used. Of course, it is possible to 
introduce some typology based on diff erent modifi cations of Kripke’s model struc-
tures, and the most relevant parameter may be the degree of deviation between the 
worlds within it (for instance, to what degree political reality is independent of fac-
tual description, i.e., to what extent it is permissible to lie). However, the typology 
would require the construction of a new meta-model, similar to the one that Orwell 
has represented in his novel, with the aim to correlate and evaluate some discourse 
that pretends to be considered as true with some other discourse, which is based on 
certain ideological priorities12 that pretend to be recognized as even more truthful. 
Th is process is reminiscent of the process of complication of political discourse as 
described above. As can be seen, not only the construction of political discourse but 
11  Сf.: “… a language may equally serve both the old, moribund system and the new, rising 
system; both the old base and the new base; both the exploiters and the exploited. It is no 
secret to anyone that the Russian language served Russian capitalism and Russian bourgeois 
culture before the October Revolution just as well as it now serves the socialist system and 
socialist culture of Russian society. Th e same must be said of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, 
Uzbek, Kazakh, Georgian, Armenian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Moldavian, Tatar, 
Azerbaijanian, Bashkirian, Turkmenian and other languages of the Soviet nations; they served 
the old, bourgeois system of these nations just as well as they serve the new, socialist system.” 
Josif Stalin, “Marxism and problems of linguistics“ (1950); accessed at https://www.marxists.
org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1950/jun/20.htm 
12 Сf “…, we study history because we are interested in it, and perhaps because we wish to 
learn something about our own problems. But history can serve neither of these two purposes 
if, under the infl uence of an idea of objectivity, we hesitate to present historical problems from 
our point of view.” (Popper 1966: 462–463) 
    As one can see, the rulers of Oceania and the champion of open society agree that history 
is dependent on political will and that the only matter is which political objectives one or the 
other “historical interpretation” stands for. 
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also its evaluation is transposed from semantics to the battlefi eld of politics: which 
projects and discourses are worthy enough to be praised as good and which are 
doomed to be considered evil. 
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Язык и политическая реальность:
переосмысливая Джорджа Оруэлла
Область референции политического дискурса зависит от языка, она есть конструкт, 
генерируемый самим дискурсом. Такое понимание соотношение между языком и 
поли тической реальностью выражено в романе Джорджа Оруэлла «1984». Понятия со-
временной семантики и прагматики позволяют эксплицировать, каким образом язык 
действует и как форма конструирования реальности, и как особый тип со циаль ного 
вербального поведения. Язык становится исключительно модальным и интенциональ-
ным, любое высказывание выражает отношения долженствования, возмож ности, и 
т.п. и может быть интерпретировано в интенсиональном и, следо вательно, референци-
ально не-прозрачном контексте. Однако семантика не утрачивает референциальную 
силу; напротив, это сила преумножается, становясь межмировым отношением. В этом 
смысле семантика поэтического дискурса сродни поэтической. Тем не менее семанти-
ческая многомерность означаемых референтов остается неяв ной, поскольку референт-
ность дискурса есть предусловие его эффективности.  Поли тический дискурс, будучи 
описанием «мира, таким как он есть», предполагает скрытую референцию к другим 
модальным контекстам: «мир в будущем» (или «в прошлом»); «каким мир должен 
(или – не должен) быть» и т.п. Область интерпре тации политического дискурса есть 
множество возможных миров.
Keel ja poliitiline reaalsus: uus vaade George Orwellile
Poliitilise diskursuse referentsvaldkond ei ole keelest sõltumatu; see valdkond on konstruee-
ritud ning seda ajendab diskursus ise. Sellist lähenemist keele ja poliitilise reaalsuse vahelisele 
suhtele väljendab George Orwelli romaan “1984”. Tänapäevane arusaam semantikast ja prag-
maatikast võimaldab sellele teatud uut vaatenurka. Sel juhul toimib keel nii tegelikkuse konst-
rueerimise vormina kui ka teatud liiki sotsiaalse verbaalse käitumisena. Keel on muutunud 
 Language and political reality: George Orwell reconsidered  149
ainüksi modaalseks ja intentsionaalseks; iga lausung väljendab kohustuse, võimaluse, jne 
suhteid ning neid võib tõlgendada intensionaalses ja seega referentsiaalselt läbipaistmatus 
kontekstis. Siiski ei kaota semantika oma referentsiaalset jõudu. Vastupidi, see jõud mitme-
kordistub, muutudes maailmaüleseks suhestumiseks. Nii on poliitilise diskursuse semanti-
ka suguluses poeetilise semantikaga; siiski on tähistatavate referentide mitmemõõtmelisus 
ähma ne, jäädes varjatuks, sest referentsiaalne diskursus on tõhususe eeltingimus. Poliitiline 
diskursus maailma kirjeldusena “sellisena, nagu see on”, eeldab peidetud referentsi/osutust 
teistele modaalsetele kontekstidele: “maailm tulevikus” (või “minevikus”); “kuidas maailm 
peaks olema” (või “ei peaks olema”), jne. Poliitilise diskursuse valdkond on võimalike maa-
ilmade kogum, mida modaalses semantikas kirjeldatakse Kripke mudeli struktuuri kaudu.
